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New imaging techniques have given us a great opportunity to recognise the 
processes that take place in the human brain, and the interest of forensic sci-
ences in this area of knowledge should come as no surprise. Th e key is to un-
derstand the processes that take place in the brain when telling a lie, which – in 
a broader perspective – can lead to the development of a technique allowing 
error-free detection of deception.
Imaging through functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) is one of the 
neuroimaging techniques that is hoped to provide a failsafe lie detector. To this 
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day, a sizeable number of experiments using the technique have been conducted 
all over the world, while forensic scientists have been keen on following its de-
velopment (see e.g.: J. Widacki 2007). Th e goal behind the article is to present 
a review of the most important current studies related to the problem.
Technological progress makes it possible to become increasingly familiar with 
the lie related processes taking place in the human brain. In the ﬁ rst studies of 
these processes, the potential evoked by a particular stimulus (Event Related 
Potential) was used, yet due to the low spatial resolution, the method is being 
slowly abandoned (Abe 2009). A more advanced technique of neuroimaging 
is Positron Emission Tomography (PET), yet the cost of its use is very high, 
which is why functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), a technique 
cheaper than PET and more precise than ERP, is commonly used.
One of the ﬁ rst experiments conducted with the use of fMRI was the one con-
ducted by Spence and collaborators (2001) less than twelve years ago. Par-
ticipating in the experiment were 40 subjects, who had earlier expressed their 
consent in writing. However, not all the people were placed in the scanner. 
Connected to the machine were only 10 (individually entering) participants, 
while the remaining group of 30 people were tested outside the scanner. Th e 
subjects were asked speciﬁ c questions, and in answering all of them they had 
to answer by telling both the truth and by lying. In the experiment conducted, 
the scientists noticed that when the participants tried to lie the reaction time 
increased insigniﬁ cantly, and speciﬁ c regions of the brain (ventrolateral pre-
frontal cortex) became activated (Spence 2001). Th e experiment conducted 
by Spence and collaborators (2001) initiated a large volume of research that 
aimed at ﬁ nding what is responsible for a lie at the neuronal level (Abe 2009).
Research on seeking the areas of the human brain related to lying has gained 
momentum. Less than a year after the experiment described by Spence and 
collaborators (2001), the results of an experiment conducted by Lee et al. 
(2002) were announced. Natives of China were selected for this experiment, 
all strongly right-handed, and all having successfully passed health tests. Th e 
subjects were asked to simulate problems with memory, which was to lead to 
an intentionally mistaken solution of two memory tasks. Th e ﬁ rst task was 
a test composed of two stimuli, each being a three digit number. Th e partici-
pant was presented with the numbers in certain time intervals (2.25 sec). Once 
both the numbers had been displayed, the subject was to state whether the 
two numbers presented (stimuli) were the same. Th e second question included 
autobiographical questions related to the subject. Th e participants were asked 
??????? ??????????? ??????????????????? ???????????????? ???? ?????????? ???
questions of the “Where were you born?” type. Th e authors of the experiment 
observed activity in various areas of the brain in the subjects. Increased reac-
tion time and increased activity of the brain were registered in the prefron-
tal cortex, temporal cortex, parietal cortex, posterior cingulate gyrus, and the 
caudate nucleus.
Published in the same year was another, equally interesting, experiment us-
ing the fMRI. Th e experiment was conducted by Langleben and collaborators 
(2002). It is worth mentioning as it combined the guilty knowledge test (GKT) 
and the aforementioned functional magnetic resonance imaging. Initially, the 
test involved the participation of 23 right-handed subjects (12 women and 11 
men), aged from 22 to 50, with an average age of 32. However, ﬁ ve subjects had 
to be excluded due to artefacts. Regular playing cards were used for the experi-
ment, and the participants had to – simplifying the matter greatly – answer 
(by lying or telling the truth) questions concerning the cards shown. Increased 
activity and reaction time were also observed in this study, among others, in 
the area of the superior frontal gyrus, interior cingulate cortex, and interior 
parietal cortex. A number of signiﬁ cant conclusions were drawn from this ex-
periment: an attempt at limiting or withholding the true answer by the subject 
can be considered an intended lie, and the superior frontal gyrus (SFG) and 
the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) can be considered the areas of the brain 
responsible for lying. Moreover, the use of the fMRI technique for distinguish-
ing between true and false answers was corroborated.
Th ree years after Langleben et al.(2002), the same group conducted another 
experiment. In 2005, they used a slightly modiﬁ ed guilty knowledge test. Th e 
experiment was conducted again with cards, but this time the experience in-
cluded a remuneration of $20, which was to make the test in a way closer to 
the conditions present in the natural environment. Participating in the experi-
ment were 26 right-handed people. Th e experiment conducted by Langleben 
et al.(2005) was the ﬁ rst attempt at a quantitative estimation of the precision 
of lie detection with the use of the fMRI technique. Th e precision in discern-
ing lie from truth was 78%. Th e ﬁ rst experiment that was to deﬁ ne patterns of 
neuronal activity for lying, and true and false memories, was the experiment 
conducted by Abe and collaborators (2008). Participating in the experiment 
were 28 right-handed native Japanese, who had all successfully passed medi-
cal tests. Th e experiment used a list of words that were used to trigger errors 
in the memory of the participants. In the experiment conducted in this way, 
the supervisors of the examination determined that providing false answers 
results in increased activity in the prefrontal cortex area.
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Most experiments using fMRI conducted to detect lie took place in premises 
designed for conducting such studies in isolation from the natural environ-
ment. Which is why, besides the introduction of gratiﬁ cation motivating the 
participants, interest began to focus on the moral aspects of such tests.
A good example is the experiment published by Green and Paxton (2009). To 
bring the conditions as close as possible to natural, they introduced monetary 
remuneration. Th e subjects were given money for the correct naming of the 
side of the coin displayed on the computer monitor (special application was 
used for dropping it). Th e participants had to write down their predictions 
or immediately provide oral answers. It must be mentioned that the subjects 
could try to cheat the researchers to obtain remuneration. Green and Pax-
ton observed an increased activity of the prefrontal cortex area accompany-
ing deception. Moreover, this form of activity also appeared in cases when 
participants tried to refrain from lying. In turn, in people who were sincere 
and honest, no increased activity in the aforementioned area was registered. 
Th e experimenters put forward a thesis that sincerity is related to the absence 
of temptation rather than to an attempt at countering it. Nevertheless, the ex-
periment was the ﬁ rst attempt at ﬁ nding a link between lie and an attempt to 
infringe on moral norms, and deﬁ ned new directions of research.
Trying to bring experiments closer to the conditions present in the natural en-
vironment, Kozel and collaborators (2009) used a sabotage related design. In 
the experiment, participants were divided into two groups. Th e task of one was 
to take into possession and destroy CDs with incriminating evidence, while the 
other did not perform such an action. Going further, the respondents from the 
ﬁ rst group had to collect an envelope from an experimenter, while the other 
group did not perform the task. Both the groups were later to claim that they 
collected the envelope and did not attempt to destroy the CDs. Later, another 
task, called the Ring – Watch Test, was conducted; in this case, the partici-
pants were to take a watch or a ring. Th e subjects were asked to lie about this. 
Out of the group of 36 people participating in the Ring – Watch Test, lie was 
detected in the case of 25 participants. Th e Ring – Watch Test made it possible 
to select a speciﬁ c number of people who were subjected to a single fMRI scan, 
this time concerning the test with envelopes and CDs. In the selected group of 
25 people, nine out of nine participants of the CD and envelope trial, and ﬁ ve 
out of 16 of the Ring – Watch Test were correctly identiﬁ ed (Kozel 2009).
One of the new directions of research was examining not only healthy people 
but also ones who were unwell, or had traumas of neurological origin. A good 
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case of such an experiment is the one conducted on patients with Parkinson’s 
disease. Th e experiment was described and conducted by Abe and collabora-
tors (2009). As is known from medical literature, Parkinson patients are more 
truthful than healthy people. Abe et al.(2009) tried to prove or deny that. Par-
ticipating in the experiment were quite a large number of subjects, who were 
divided into two groups. Th e ﬁ rst consisted of 32 people aﬀ ected with Parkin-
son’s and 20 healthy individuals. Th e second group, in turn, was composed of 
14 healthy people (seven women and seven men). Participants in the experi-
ment were shown photographs, and later were asked questions concerning 
the illustrations. As can be guessed, the subjects were asked to lie or to tell the 
truth. In this study, Abe and collaborators (2009) used the PET technique. Th e 
researchers corroborated the hypotheses that people aﬀ ected with Parkinson’s 
are more likely to tell the truth than healthy ones. Th is is probably caused by 
a dysfunction of the prefrontal cortex. Moreover, the experiment showed that 
there is a powerful link between the prefrontal cortex (or to be more precise: 
left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex) with the processes that constitute a lie, and 
that the unique truthfulness of Parkinson patients has neurological grounds 
(Abe 2009).
Another good example of this type of experience comes from the experiment 
described by Kikuchi and collaborators (2010). Participating in the study were 
people who suﬀ ered from psychogenic (dissociative) amnesia. Th e experi-
menters observed activity of the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, probably 
related to the unconscious suppression of memory.
Th e experiment aimed at recognising the reactions of people observing at-
tempts at deception was conducted by Grezes and collaborators (2004). Th e 
experiment consisted in watching videos and the subjects being later asked to 
answer whether the weight of the box lifted was actually as big as the expres-
sion of the actors suggested, or whether the actors were trying to deceive the 
viewers. Th e experimenters observed a major increase of activity in the rostral 
part of the anterior cingulate cortex area and in the amygdala in people who 
believed that the actor was trying to deceive them. Moreover, similar experi-
ments conducted two years later by Grezes et al.(2006) revealed an increase of 
activity in the area of the amygdala when the subjects realised that the actor 
had deceived them.
In a somewhat diﬀ erent experiment by Harad and collaborators (2009) con-
cerning moral assessment and lying, a signiﬁ cant increase of activity was re-
corded in the caudate nucleus, medial prefrontal cortex, lateral orbitofrontal 
cortex, the left temporal lobe, and the left temporoparietal junction (TPJ).
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Worth noting is the test whose results were published by Etcoﬀ  (2000), who 
stated that participants of the test suﬀ ering from aphasia, probably caused by 
a left middle cerebral artery stroke, which made them lose linguistic abilities 
had much better capacity in lie detection than healthy individuals. Etcoﬀ ’s dis-
covery (2000) resulted in putting forward a hypotheses that the regions of the 
left hemisphere of the human brain play a small role in the process of human 
lie detection. Varied activity of the many areas in the brain during experiments 
with functional magnetic resonance imaging concerning lie detection poses 
a major problem. A number of studies to corroborate the claim have been 
conducted.
An experiment undertaken to deﬁ ne the existence of a speciﬁ c area in the 
human brain that would show activity during the process of lying in every 
subject was conducted by Montelone and collaborators (2009). Unfortunately, 
the results of the study were not in line with expectations. Th e experimenters 
ascertained that so far it is impossible to deﬁ ne a speciﬁ c area of the human 
brain, identical for every person, that would be responsible for lying. However, 
as was noticed in the earlier studies, the area of the medial prefrontal cor-
tex (mPFC) showed certain activity. As Montelone and collaborators (2009) 
remarked, the technique of functional magnetic resonance imaging does not 
seem to discriminate processes that would be unique for deception.
In another experiment, Lee and collaborators (2010) tested neuronal correlates 
of lie related to aﬀ ective information. Besides fMRI, the experiment also used 
the International Aﬀ ective Picture System (IAPS), a collection of illustrations 
subjected to the process of standardisation. Th anks to such composition of the 
set, the experimenters can choose photographs providing particular stimuli 
causing various emotions. Lee et al.(2010) assumed that activation of the hu-
man brain while uttering a true statement should signiﬁ cantly diﬀ er from acti-
vation while lying. Participating in the experiment were 14 right-handed males 
from the age group of 25–39, with the median at 29.44 years. Every participant 
was tested for psychological and neurological conditions. Th e study did not 
cover the results obtained from one of the subjects, as the person was unable 
to complete the experiment. Th e IAPS was slightly modiﬁ ed for potential cul-
tural diﬀ erences. Th e stimuli were provided by IAPS illustrations; 96 photo-
graphs were used in all, with 48 of them aimed at causing positive emotions, 
and 48 – negative. Simplifying assumptions, the experiment had the subjects 
answer (falsely or truthfully) the question of the type “What sensations does 
this photograph cause in you? Positive or negative?” Th e respondent was pro-
vided with information whether he or she was to use the button that attested 
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that the subject was telling the truth, or whether his or her task was to deceive 
the asker of the question. For example, when the message “lie” was displayed 
with a photograph causing negative emotions, the respondent was to convince 
the psychologist that in his or her case the photograph shown evoked positive 
emotions (Lee and collaborators, 2010). Th e experiment conducted by Lee and 
collaborators (2010) used event related design. Eighty trials were conducted, 
each composed of two parts, with one half containing negative stimuli, and the 
other – positive, in random order. Th e supervisors observed increased activity 
among others in parts of the brain including the left superior medial frontal, 
left middle frontal, and left inferior frontal when the participant lied, yet if 
the subject told the truth, the increase of activity was present among others 
in the left superior frontal, right calcarine, and right postcentral. Th e people 
deceptive about the illustrations that were to trigger positive emotions showed 
greater activity in areas including the right middle frontal gyrus, and left mid-
dle cingulum gyrus; moreover, greater activity in the visual perceptual system 
and the area responsible for emotions was discovered (Lee and collaborators, 
2010). When the subjects were deceptive about illustrations that pointed to 
negative emotions, increased activity was observed in the left inferior orbital 
frontal gyrus, and left lingua. Th e experiment conducted by Lee et al.(2010) 
shows a certain type of interaction between cognitive processes accompany-
ing lying and emotions. Increased reaction time and increase of activity in the 
frontal-parietal area is present, independent of the aﬀ ective stimulus. Yet, one 
may hypothesise that the increase of activity in the remaining areas may be 
caused by the emotional stimulus. It must be noted that the neuronal corre-
lates of lying do not depend only and solely on the type of deception, but also 
on the emotional value. Such an approach to research may allow acquiring 
information concerning lying for proﬁ t, and deception in fear of punishment 
(Lee and collaborators, 2010).
It is worth remembering that the problem of the stability of lie detection is not 
limited only and solely to the functional magnetic resonance imaging. Other 
methods of neuroimaging are used with greater or lesser success. Interestingly, 
to achieve better, and hence more precise, results the fMRI is combined with 
other methods of neuroimaging (Positron Emission Tomography (PET), Nu-
clear Magnetic Resonance (NMR), magneto-electroencephalography (MEG), 
and electroencephalography (EEG)), and with deception detection techniques 
developed earlier.
Th e experiment conducted by Seth and collaborators (2006) proved that mag-
neto-electroencephalography can be helpful in deﬁ ning areas responsible for 
lying.
??????????? ??????
Positron Emission Tomography (PET) is one of the neuroimaging techniques 
that was also used in experiments on detecting deception. In an experiment 
described by Abe and collaborators (2006), it was proved that prefrontal cor-
tex activity can be linked to deception. Participating in the study were 14 males 
who had no history of psychological or neurological conditions. All the par-
ticipants in the study were right-handed, with the average age of 20.4 years. 
Before the planned brain scanning, the subjects had to participate in tests, in 
which they coloured pictures, played instruments, and solved puzzles. Every 
task was designed so as to be diﬀ erent than the others, which means that every 
picture coloured presented something else, and the instruments played were 
of diﬀ erent type. Later, during a PET scan, the subjects were presented with 
photographs of the instruments they played and objects and ﬁ gures they had 
coloured. Th e photographs also included new pictures and objects that they 
had not encountered during the experiment. One of the tasks of the partici-
pants was to tell the truth or lie about the illustrations shown. Th e experiment-
ers observed greatest activity during attempts at deception in the area of the 
prefrontal cortex (Abe and collaborators, 2006).
Th e large number of experiments using the fMRI helped beyond doubt to ex-
pand our knowledge of the processes taking place in the human brain. In most 
experiments, an increase of activity in the prefrontal cortex was observed, 
which can prove that this region plays the main role in the process of decep-
tion. Nevertheless, it must not be forgotten that in some experiments the re-
gion was not the main area of increased activity. Th is is why focusing studies 
solely on this area still seems to be highly problematic (Abe 2009). As rightly 
noted by Sip and collaborators (2007), functional magnetic resonance imag-
ing replicates the problems present in the polygraph. One can quote here, for 
example, the case with the manipulation of the BOLD signal by the subjects 
(Bles and Haynes, 2008). Nevertheless, there are hopes for detection of the 
aforementioned attempts of manipulation (Sip and collaborators, 2007).
Th ese are not the only problems with fMRI. As is generally known, the experi-
ments are conducted on a well selected group of participants, in most cases 
right-handed, of the same gender. Testing with the use of fMRI was conducted 
with individuals in isolation. It must be taken into account that people who 
have committed a crime and will be examined later will strongly diﬀ er from 
such a rigid selection (Sip and collaborators, 2007).
In turn, the factors determining the decision that the given person should lie 
are not constant or permanent, and depend on beliefs and convictions. Hence 
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these factors will change in every subject, and must be taken into account dur-
ing an fMRI study. A good though extreme case that can illustrate the problem 
is psychopathy (Sip and collaborators, 2007).
As J. Widacki (2007) rightly remarked, the use of neuroimaging methods also 
brings various new problems of an ethical and legal nature. Th e use of neu-
roimaging methods may lead to an excessive encroachment on human privacy, 
which is why a set of principles that will be able to ﬁ ll in the gap should these 
new methods be used, whether in lie detection or for other reasons, should be 
developed.
Th e last problem that fMRI causes is of a technical nature. First, fMRI scan-
ners are bulky devices that cannot be moved as simply as a polygraph, which 
can prove a diﬃ  culty. A phenomenon encountered during the fMRI is the so-
called scanner drift. Th e device requires plenty of energy to be able to work 
for an extended period, which makes the image of the scanner “hover” due to 
heating. Nevertheless, it seems that – thanks to rapid technological progress – 
this problem will be the ﬁ rst to be solved.
Th e use of a guilty knowledge test in experiments with fMRI seems a good so-
lution when it comes to lie detection, which is why experts should use it more 
frequently (Sip and collaborators, 2007).
It is diﬃ  cult to deﬁ ne clearly the diagnostic value in the case of experiments 
conducted with the use of the functional magnetic resonance imaging to dis-
cover deception. Bles and Haynes (2008) claim that in certain experiments, 
the precision of the method exceeds 90%. Reaching this value is declared also 
by NoLieMRI, a company oﬀ ering fMRI lie detection and quoting similar in-
formation on its website (noliemri.com/products/overview.htm; see also: Da-
vatzikos C. et al, 2005; Wolpe P.R. et al, 2005).
Despite numerous experiments conducted with fMRI, plenty of doubts con-
cerning the precision of the method remain, and the path to the development 
of a tool allowing lie detection based on fMRI seems long and uncertain. It 
must be stated clearly that, with the current advancement of development, 
implementation of the fMRI method in forensic sciences practice is deﬁ nitely 
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